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A conversation with late Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Mushaf Ali Mir of Pakistan Air Force (PAF)
sometime around 2002 comes to my mind, wherein he was seldom praising our Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited's (HAL) Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project. Perhaps it looked all rosy for
him; especially considering the state that his country was in at that time. Also, one did not
choose to correct his impression for reasons which were but obvious.
Image Attribute: A helmet of one of the pilots of ill-fated Mirage 2000 Trainer which crashed at HAL
Bangalore facility on January 31, 2019. 
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The recent untimely crash of Mirage 2000 trainer aircraft at HAL's Bangalore facility and
the consequent fatalities of two invaluable Test Pilots need to make our policymakers sit up
and think. From my early memories, one knows about the below par performance standards
maintained by the HAL, from HF24 to Gnats to MiG 21s to MiG 23/27s, MiG 29s, the Sukhois
and now even the Mirages.
And to think that recent political furor over the Rafale deal talked about NOT giving HAL it’s
due. Also, Dassault had refused to have any truck with this inefficient organization and for
good reason. The company has done many "acceptance flights" over the years at HAL's Ojhar
facility (near Nashik) and also, seen the operational dynamics of HAL Bangalore. One can
easily understand the financial year end frenzy at these establishments and the slipshod
slippages in timeframes, poor quality of overhaul and support which are alike across the
board, for aircraft and equipment. Lack of competition within the country and
nonparticipation of the civilian sector have virtually sounded the death knell for this
behemoth white elephant which comes under the list of non-performing public sector
undertaking (PSU) category.
Valid Doubts
Whilst most such enterprises in the world such as the Turkish Aircraft Industry (TAI) and Israel
Aircraft Industry (IAI) have progressed by leaps and bounds in their capabilities, on the other
hand over the recent decades HAL got bogged down by inferior Soviet-era technology and its
own trade union culture. And with such unproven capabilities, it is no surprise that HAL is
found missing from most prominent global air shows such as the Farnborough Air Show. And
to think that this body is going to be tasked with more and more new platforms such as the
Avro replacement CN 235, advanced attack helicopters such as the American Apaches or
perhaps even the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) Rafale at some stage. Transfer
of Technology normally entails the valuable transfer of expertise, experience, and innovative
quality control norms. The HAL has definitely not learned much from its earlier debacles with
the MiG and Sukhoi series. Book adjustments from captive clients such as the IAF, the Indian
Navy (IN), and Indian Army (IA) have kept their coffers strong, regardless of recent motivated
media outbursts about the poor state of its order books.
Redefining the Leadership 
Leadership (at HAL) has been a worry for sure. For a venture with such a precarious national
security charter, we need to see a dynamic leader at the top. Past attempts at bringing in IAF
functionaries such as ACMs like Lal, Mehra, Katre, and Air Marshal Wollen come to mind.
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Such appointments were systematically scuttled later on by the techno-bureaucratic war
machine, leaving promotees and political appointees as CEOs. It's high time for the
government; it needs to re-consider deploying the serving IAF functionaries at higher
management levels to enhance accountability. Also, meritocracy should be brought across
the hierarchy to ensure value for money spent. With the launch of the Defence Industrial
Corridors, the government should actively promote a combination of Public-Private
Partnership (PPE) and invite renowned foreign players (such as IAI, Lockheed or BAE) to
participate with HAL at strategic levels (of course, the FDI clause has to be tweaked case-to-case
basis).
Way Forward
The reorganization of HAL needs to be undertaken on a war footing, ensuring a
seamless transition to higher outputs and state of the art capability. 
IAF Base Repair Depots (BRDs) need to be upgraded to take on major servicing and
upgrade challenges related to avionics and other weapon systems. 
To overcome the knowledge gap, Ex-IAF personnel and direct entry candidates are
called for. Performance-based appraisal and promotions need to be incorporated. 
A high-level study on the lines of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC)  should be
instituted forthwith to identify and remedy problem areas. 
HAL’s is a sad story of incompetence and nonaccountability. The malaise that afflicts HAL
would be applicable to many such as factories owned by Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), some
of which have recently had unexplained fire accidents. These defense PSUs need to be
treated at par with the Defence Forces, their rules of engagement and company laws
rehashed to cope with those amenable to a war-driven organization, lest we find ourselves
like a toothless tiger in today’s competitive strategic environment.
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